Standard Operating Procedure: A War Story by Phillip Gourevitch and Errol Morris

Published on February 28, 2010 in Reviews. Closed Tags: , , , .

Definitely one of the most disturbing books you can read on the topic of torture and arbitrary detention. Gourevitch uses the source material from Errol Morris’s documentary film and the two of them painstakingly reconstruct the history of Abu Ghraib from the US invasion in 2003 onwards. From the early initial planning (of which there was painfully little) to the development of ad hoc responses leading to under-manning, poor oversight, even poorer location and abuse of prisoners; all the details are carefully recorded and laid out in a tight and coherent timeline. There are few surprises about the main story: two of the most important being the fact that the location of the Abu Ghraib prison complex left it open to daily mortar attacks which extracted a considerable physical and psychological toll on the MPs and MIs manning the complex. Lack of training and a deliberate unwillingness to outline any policy, combined with a building pressure to extract information to stop the recurring attacks on US forces; meant that prisoner abuse such as extensive PT, sleep deprivation, ‘Palestinian hanging’ (apparently this is a commonly used term now in military detention), enforced nudity, forced wearing of womens’ undergarments, deprivation of food and occasional mild physical blows were all part of the strategy to ‘break’ the prisoners. The shocking thing that emerges is that hardly any, usable intelligence was extracted through these methods, a fact which gradually dawned on the interrogators but which didn’t seem to have any impact on policy.

The most alarming thing was that this was definitely not a case of a ‘few bad apples’ as the Bush administration was so desperate to claim. Senior officers, from General Ricardo Sanchez onwards played an important role in allowing MIs to effectively operate outside normal military SOP and the Geneva Conventions and authorised the use of techniques such as sleep deprivation, withholding of food and clothing and use of dogs and stress positions. At almost every stage during the on-going prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib the eyes of officialdom from the occasional visits by JAG officers, to doctors and medics who were called in to treat prisoners injured during interrogations were able to observe what was occurring but did nothing to intervene and indeed condone it. By far one of the most damning aspects of the situation was that the majority of prisoners at Abu Ghraib were acknowledged to be innocent of any charges, having either been picked up by the US forces on wrong intelligence or being in the wrong location at the wrong time or being related to the wrong people. However, even after their innocence was established getting them released proved to be a slow and almost impossible process; mainly because in an atmosphere where it was difficult to definitively tell friend from foe, no one wanted to take the risk of mistakenly releasing potential insurgents. Plainly, wholesale detention of those suspected to be mostly innocent was seen as a preferable alternative. While understandable on an emotional level; this was extremely counter-productive not only from the point of view of policing the detainees within the prison system but also the broader objective of winning acceptance of the US presence in Iraq and the invasion.

The fact that no personnel above the rank of sergeant served any prison time and that senior officers were merely given fines and reprimands, except for the commander of the MP regiment Brig. Gen. Jane Karpinski who was actually reduced in rank to Colonel and formally reprimanded, indicates that while there was command failure at all levels, there was no command responsibility. In the words of Colonel Pappas who was the senior commanding officer on site at the prison complex “I am not going down for this alone”. This quote was in reference to the death of al-Jamadi a detainee being interrogated by civilian CIA interrogators and who died when brought to Abu Ghraib from another prison. His entrance was not documented and consequently the CIA absolved itself from any responsibility of his death, leading to a panic amongst the officers at the prison complex. Eventually his body was cleaned and sanitised and then packed with ice and stored in the shower area; where hours later a staged show involving medics and an ambulance was enacted and his body carried out covered on a stretcher with the story that he had collapsed and had a heart attack. The MPs who had to watch and transport his body during this charade were well aware of the truth having uncovered and photographed his dead body; and in the words of one of them Sabrina Harman now had no trust in their commanding officers who were ‘quite clearly lying to us’.

It is important to note that while the revelation of the photos of abuse, are what drove the initial public outrage and the investigation into the prison regime; none of those photographed or involved as MPs actually caused the death or severe physical harm to any of the prisoners. Their instructions were to mentally break the prisoner’s resistance and appropriately punish those who were unco-operative. The actual interrogations where the worst abuse occurred and where the occasional homicide happened, were undertaken by OGA (Other Government Agencies a catch-all term for the intelligence and covert agencies, usually the CIA) interrogators; who effectively set the prison regime. It is illuminating that none of these officials were even identified much less brought to trial or account for their actions. Repeatedly, through this whole sordid affair, the MPs were instructed by their officers that they were to aid the OGA interrogators and given them unquestioning support in their interrogations. Anytime concerns or objections were raised, they were either overruled or the personnel in question transferred.

Only one senior officer Lt. Col. Jordan was court-martialled for offences at Abu Ghraib and he was acquitted of all charges in 2007 being given just a fine and an official reprimand. Other senior officers such as Captain Carolyn Wood, whose interrogation methods when adopted by her team at Bagram airbase in Afghanistan lead to 3 officially recognised homicides, one of which was later determined to be of a man with no connections to the Taliban or Al Qaeda, was actually decorated for her services in Afghanistan and Iraq and continues to serve with the military police. In the words of one officer, Lt. Col Vic Harris; the attitude of the Army senior staff was to seek to cover up the abuse and when that proved impossible, it was to limit its potential damage and any investigation that would follow.

On the detainees themselves, quite clearly, many subjected to the worst abuse; were themselves mentally unstable. Their nicknames given to them by the MPs say it all: ‘Shitboy’ ‘Swamp-thing’ ‘Santa Claus’ were either senile old men, suffering from PTSD or in the early stages of mental breakdown; engaging in coprophagy and refusing all food. One of the most iconic photos, that of the prisoner standing on the wooden box, with wires attached to his hands; with the threat of electrocution if he fell off the box; was later discovered to be innocent and actually used as a cleaner in the prison complex but as usual not released for administrative purposes. He actually shared cigarettes, meals and camaraderie with his former captors and abusers. A similar story was told of two other prisoners who endured various forms of abuse after the suspected rape of another prisoner at the complex.

There are some drawbacks to Gourevitch’s writing. He had decided to rely heavily on interviews of the MPs involved; which makes sense given the photos and the interaction that they had with the prisoners. But this leads to two problems; the worst abuse, such as physical torture and homicide are not covered since they were carried out by OGA interrogators who remain shadowy figures throughout this entire episode. Neither are any senior officers such as Col. Pappas or Lt. Col. Jordan or Gen. Sanchez interviewed. This puts the MPs at the centre of the drama, which although they might have in terms of the level and amount of contact they had with detainees; gives a false impression of their formal responsibility; since they were very much always acting under orders or in institutional settings whose rules had been devised by others apart from themselves. Having said this, the decision to uncritically record and reiterate their accounts, with minimal contextualisation or judgement allows them to expound on their rationalisations and defences of their actions; which are misleading to the reader as it gives the impression that the authors agree or at least refuse to correct such self-serving interpretations. Such accounts should have been treated more critically; especially given that they almost uniformly across the board seek to reduce, explain and excuse their own behaviour while seeking to deflect blame on others such as senior officers and the environment. To hear them tell it, none of them liked working at the prison, none of them enjoyed any part of the process, none of them thought the abuse was correct and almost all of them wanted it stopped or made some protest/complaints at some stage or another. This might well be true but it is barely supported by any other evidence from other parties or sectors, documentary or oral. One can’t help wondering that if such actions were so distressing and demoralising, why those engaged in them didn’t do more to either stop them or request a transfer. Not one of those involved did.

This is an excellent book and well worth reading; though it makes for a painful and in parts sickening experience. Highly recommended.

Mullahs on the Mainframe by Jonah Blank

Published on August 1, 2009 in Reviews. Closed Tags: , .

To some extent, my reviewing the book Mullahs on the Mainframe (Jonah Blank, University of Chicago Press) is narcissistic. Not in the sense of vanity, but rather the more general sense of overt self-contemplation. The book is a cultural anthropology study of my own religious comunity, the Dawoodi Bohra muslims (one of the Ismaili branches of the Shi’a sect). Yet, Jonah (who signed my copy) has managed to use his observations about my community as a springboard for a broader investigation of modernity as it relates to Islam, and he leverages it into a fairly powerful repudiation of many stereotypes that not only impede relations between East and West, but often actively undermine them. As such, I read this book on two levels, the superficial level of curiosity about how my own familiar community looks from an outsider’s perspective, and the more profound level of global socio-politics. It is a testament to Jonah’s credentials that I was able to “forget” I am Bohra, or even Muslim, and appreciate his analysis on its own merits independent of my own affiliations.

Mullahs on the Mainframe by Jonah Blank

Mullahs on the Mainframe by Jonah Blank


The book begins with an extensive overview of the history of Islam, detailing the specific doctrinal schisms that led to the Bohras as a separate group. The discussion of the early Shi’a and Sunni split is probably of highest interest to most readers, naturally, but Jonah does an impressive job of conveying the epic quality of the office of the Dai ul-Mutlaq, which has governed the community’s religious affairs for the past 1000 years. After the historical introduction, the book begins the ethnography, with chapters devoted to Bohra rituals of life, major events and observances, domestic life (with special emphasis on the status of women), and more. Naturally it is impossible for an outsider to fully characterize the complex and fine-grained details of daily life. The second part of the book is the analysis, devoted to the religious influences and institutions within the community. Again, there are many details left out, and Jonah of course focuses attention on some things that seem important to him but with which an insider would disagree. But the overall picture is coherent and illuminating and even informative to members like myself. I learned a few things about my own community from this book.

The book’s website has a fairly long excerpt that directly addresses the deeper implications and benefits of studying a community such as mine, that has fully embraced the modern world, yet also strongly comitted to its cultural and religious heritage. Jonah discusses Edward Said’s thesis that study of the East amounts to “cultural imperialism” and rejects it, arguing that (as his study of the Bohra community demonstrates) “what is needed is more cultural outreach rather than less. The best way to defeat ignorance is through knowledge, imperfect as such a search may be.”

All of this leads to the inevitable question by non-Muslims – what is “real” Islam have to say on modernity? There have been numerous examples of pundits and bloggers and columnists whoose opinions on Islam range from leery to outright hostile. Jonah makes a strong case with empirical evidence to support his assertion that “Islam is far too varied and complex to have a single, authoritative position on the topic of modernity.” :

For every hidebound Taliban zealot who condemns television or female education as bid’a (innovation), there are tens of thousands of other Muslims who do not. By what standard is he more “Islamic” than they? An excellent case could be made that it is the literalists themselves who are outside the mainstream of contemporary Islam.
…
A thorough discussion of Islam and modernity would fill several bookshelves. I have raised the topic merely to indicate a few premises underlying this study, in brief:

- Western perceptions of Islam in general, and Islamic fundamentalism in particular, are based upon the views of a small, unrepresentative sampling of Muslim attitudes and beliefs.
- Even these self-styled spokesmen of Islamic traditionalism are often less categorically hostile to modernist ideas than is generally recognized.
- There are tremendous numbers of wholly orthodox Muslims, both individuals and entire communities, living their lives in strict accordance with a traditionalist interpretation of the faith, yet displaying few (if any) of the anti-Western, antisecular, antimodern attitudes commonly associated with this level of Islamic devotion.

Jonah is careful to avoid making extreme generalizations. The truth that Islam is complex applies both ways – just as the extremists cannot be said to represent all of Islam, neither of course can the moderates. But Jonah instead uses his data on the Bohra community to make a more direct but in some ways far more critical point: that the distinction between Islam and the West is not a clear boundary:

It is my hope that the portrait of the Bohra community presented in this study will help dispel some commonly held misperceptions about fundamentalist Islam. I do not argue that traditional Muslim values are identical (or even particularly similar) to those of modern Western society – merely that they can be compatible with so-called modern Western values. I would argue that the values Western triumphalists like to claim as their own (respect for human and civil rights, pursuit of social justice, equality of sexes, promotion of liberal education, aptitude for technology) are hardly limited to the West. And “modernity” (whatever its definition may be), is something far broader than a taste for sex, drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll.
…
Are the Bohras themselves an anomaly among Muslims? Whether or not they are representative of Islam’s future, the Daudi Bohras shatter stereotypes about traditionalist Islam today. As a community of up to one million devout Shi’a whose faith is every bit as fundamental to them as it is for Afghans, Saudis, or Iranians, they present an example that must be taken seriously. While adhering faithfully to traditional Islamic norms, the Bohras eagerly accept most aspects of modernity, strongly support the concept of a pluralist civil society, boast a deeply engrained heritage of friendly engagement with members of other communities, and have a history of apolitical quietism stretching back nearly a thousand years.

Not all traditionalist Muslims are like the Daudi Bohras – but not all are so very different.

I am a muslim, and I consider myself to be a Westerner also. My entire life has been a struggle to balance the competing priorities of these aspects of my identity and I have (in my opinion) largely succeeded.

A Million Bullets: The Story of the British Army in Afghanistan – James Fergusson

Published on July 23, 2009 in Reviews. 3 Comments

million-bulletsThis is the first major account on the British operations in Helmand province in southern Afghanistan to be written by a journalist and by large it doesn’t disappoint; providing an excellent description of Operation Herrick 4 that took place in 2006 and the first half of 2007. The title of the book itself is a tongue in cheek jab at John Reid who was Defence Secretary in 2006’s by now infamous quote that he would prefer it if the British army didn’t have to “fire a single bullet” in southern Afghanistan. This unfortunately was not the case and Fergusson reveals that the British army in Helmand did fire over 1 million bullets between October 2006 and March 2007; this figure excludes artillery ordnance and bombs dropped by Coalition air forces or munitions expended by ground attacks carried out by air support. As Fergusson wryly reports, the MoD soon stopped releasing figures on the munitions expended as it didn’t fit well with the “hearts and minds” campaign that was being propounded as approach to defeat the Taliban (the actual figures on munitions expended was only made available by the MoD after Fergusson was able to request an former member of the Army and now an MP Adam Holloway who submitted a written request to the MoD and was given the figures).

The main focus of the book is the fighting that took place at the base of New Zad, which was held by the Gurkhas and the Royal Fusiliers and the capture and then withdrawal from Mus Qala by the Royal Irish. Fergusson has been able to interview officers and men from the regiments involved; as well as senior command figures based both in Kabul and London. He has also interviewed personnel and pilots from the helicopter wings of the RAF and the Army Air Corps who were responsible for piloting the essential Chinook and Apache helicopters during the operations. Also, rarely, Fergusson was able to utilise his Afghan contacts formed from an earlier book published years ago on Afghanistan to clandestinely travel and meet with district Taliban commanders and their men in Kandahar province. This interview gives a rare chance to observe the conflict from the Taliban’s perspective and those who fight with them. While one may be sceptical as to the real nature of who Fergusson exactly met; the account makes for some interesting reading and is one of the few direct versions that is able to access this side of the story since the start of the conflict. In fact, no other journalist working on a project this size has managed to succeed in obtaining such an interview and several attempts like those of Sean Langan, the documentary film-maker, have ended up with the journalists being taken hostage and only released after negotiations and payment of a ransom.

The book is well worth reading itself for the details of the fighting and the nature of the conflict at the ground level. Some facts do emerge though clearly: firstly the Taliban are quite well organised if a disparate insurgency with a committed ideological core (what NATO planners call ‘Tier 1’) and a looser grouping of opportunists, those seeking revenge/on vendettas and disgruntled groups/opium farmers jockeying for position at the provincial level. They are also well equipped, the Gurkhas undertook the single longest defence of a static defence for over 3 months at the compound at New Zad and engaged in nightly fire-fights and duels involving small arms fire, mortars and heavy machine-guns. That the Taliban were able to sustain this level of contact for this period indicates that they are as well supplied and provisioned as the Coalition forces and do have formidable logistical supply lines that can allow them to wage an intense insurgency for a considerable period of time. Short of heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry; they possess almost everything else from recoilless rifles, heavy machine guns, rockets and RPGs – all the legacy of the Pakistani arms bazaar and the availability of cheap Soviet weaponry. They also possess a reasonable degree of training and skills; ‘bracketing’ with mortars was experienced, as were adaptations to evade the night-vision capabilities of the Coalition forces (some of this night-vision equipment was also captured and used by the Taliban themselves). Thirdly, Coalition intelligence is abysmally poor; it is difficult to tell who is the Taliban, who is neutral and who is supportive of the Karzai regime. This is related to the nature of the Coalition allies the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the provincial governors that are appointed to the provinces and who by way of having President Karzai’s ear are able to influence the actions of Coalition troops. Hence the suspicion by some officers that many operations are targeting local rivals and opium mafia; as opposed to actual Tier 1 Taliban insurgents – yet politically handicapped by the need to be seen to be supporting the Kabul government, such operations are frequently carried despite their dubious nature and impact on the insurgency.

The reliability of the ANP and the ANA deserves its own section; desertion is a chronic problem as is drug abuse and a reluctance to engage in aggressive operations. The ANP are regarded as little more than bandits; their checkpoints on the roads widely seen as opportunities to extort bribes from the populace – in one instance the ANP actually do subcontract out the manning of a check-post to some armed militia who do the extracting while the ANP relax in the cool air of their offices! There are also disturbing stories about sexual abuse and rape of both boys and girls by ANP officers and men, on at least one occasion it was apparent that an allegation of sexual abuse led to the removal of a district ANP commander who had upset the local elders and townsfolk by his open habit of seizing young boys and then forcing them to sleep with him. More worryingly, from a security point of view, there are at least several instances where the ANP are revealed to have Taliban sympathies and several are arrested at New Zad after they have been caught giving away firing positions and radioing information to the Taliban forces before an attack. The quality of the allies not only makes the operational conduct of the war much more hazardous but it means that the local population have little confidence in the Kabul govt or love for the face of the Coalition backed regime when it comes in the guise of ANP men who are keen to extort bribes and intimidate civilians but not keen to do much else. This raises serious questions about the viability of any nascent Afghan state apparatus.

Perhaps the most important part of the book is contained in pages 152-164; which deal with the strategy of Operation Herrick 4. Initially meant to follow the ‘inkspot’ strategy that was used in the Malayan campaign; where by secured areas are opened up to development projects and governance to win the trust of the local population thereby undermining popular support for the insurgency; Operation Herrick quickly careers out of control. The reasons for this are complex and Fergusson does an admirable job of representing the main arguments –ranging from interference from the Afghan President’s office, to contrary efforts by American forces on the ground, to the paucity of troops, the inability to establish enough secure areas quickly enough and the nature of the personnel and units selected who were more interested in ‘kinetic’ (read fighting) operations rather than COIN warfare. There is enough blame to go around and Fergusson does a succinct job in distributing it fairly as possible.

The blunt fact is that few secure areas were established, British forces were spread too thinly across too many fixed position which then became besieged by Taliban forces and which had to then be tenaciously held without reinforcement and supplied precariously by air. The interviews with Chinook and Apache pilots are especially interesting to offer an airman’s view on the war. With a small resource base, the RAF and AA effectively were able to meet the demands placed on them only be violating regulations on the amount of airtime that could be safely clocked up and by cannibalising their surplus stock of spares. This resource clearly was also stretched to breaking point. There also was another loss; in terms of the number of pilots leaving the service once their period of enlistment was over and in some cases resigning before then; the personal strains were also apparent in the high rates of divorces and separations by spouses following extended deployment in Afghanistan, frequently in violation of the Air Force’s own rules of procedure. This is a significant loss given that some pilots such as the Apache flyers cost nearly £1 million to train and prepare for combat.

The problem of morale exists for the other soldiers as well; as though there is a strong desire to help the Afghan population and genuine concern shown to make an improvement in the lives of the locals; there is no clear idea as to what the British mission is exactly and why they are there. This compounded with the sense of detachment the rest of British society has viewed much of the conflict and the opposition to it; leads many to question the real reasons why they are risking their lives in the country. As one officer put it the “army is war but the nation is not”. The lack of progress made on the developmental front and the nature of the ANP and ANA allies further serves to cause more alienation from the stated aims of the mission. While professionalism and the esprit de corps ensures that there will be no breakdown in discipline; this is not a war that is very popular amongst the troops and this sentiment will only increase with time and with greater causalities.

The retreat from Mus Qala done initially because supplies of essential munitions were running low and the brigade force already stretched to breaking point was finding it difficult to hold all the towns under attack is an important example of what kind of problems exist at the ground level. A truce offered and then accepted by the town’s elders; to protect the town from further destructive fighting persuaded both the British and the Taliban to agree to a ceasefire whereby the British would withdraw from the town and a police force made of the sons of the town elders would maintains security with the Taliban agreeing to halt operations in the area as well. Almost with relief the offer is accepted by the British as they are unsure as to whether they could hold on any longer; and the Taliban too accept – yet the actual act of withdrawal is hard to portray in any other light except as a tactical setback; despite Fergusson’s best efforts to put a spin on it. Especially when the truce is broken as the Taliban reoccupy the town – leading to a subsequent operation months down the line when it has to be recaptured by Coalition forces. The causes of the breakdown are not made clear; though it is surmised that the Americans unhappy at what they saw as British unwillingness to fight the Taliban engineering a breakdown by bombing and killing the local Taliban commander. This indicates the tensions of operating in a Coalition and the different agendas of the Americans and the British as much as anything else. Indeed, complaints about the heavy-handedness of American SF operations, which are outside formal Coalition command and which frequently lead to significant civilian causalities – the fallout of which fall on the local Coalition forces to deal with, is a running complaint throughout the book by British officers and soldiers. This led to a subsequent operation by coalition forces to recapture the town in December 2007 – the subject of another excellent book “Operation Snakebite” by Stephen Grey.

The last chapter where Fergusson travels and meets a group of Taliban commanders, is worth reading directly; while they are committed Tier 1 fighters; it is clear that they view the struggle as much as a nationalist one as a religious duty. Fergusson had considerable difficulty in arranging the meeting, which he was able to do through his relationship with Mir, an Afghan refugee on whose life story he had written an earlier book ‘Kandahar Cockney’ who puts him in touch with a chain of fixers leading to a sojourn in Quetta; where after numerous delays due to the difficulty in vetting whether he can be trusted or not and the pressures being put on the insurgency by Operation Achilles; he is eventually granted the opportunity to travel to Wardak province to meet with the commander of Taliban forces in the province and his main lieutenants. The encounter makes fascinating reading, though Fergusson can perhaps be accused with some justification of dramatising aspects of it for greater impact; however the episode does show the determination and their own peculiar code of honour and malmastia – which ensures that Fergusson not only is guaranteed safe conduct as a guest but will be defended to the death from any attackers including the Americans – shows to Fergusson the depth of belief and the unwillingness to yield amongst the core of the resistance. Defeating such a group, if they have adequate numbers and all indications is that they do, will be extremely hard if not near impossible. It is worth recounting part of this remarkable interview:

“Tell me,” said one of the lieutenants, leaning forward and shyly clearing his throat. ‘Please don’t take this as an insult or anything, but…..supposing thousands of Afghans had invaded your country, and bombed your villages, and killed your wives and children, what would you do?”

“I’d fight,” I found myself saying. “Of course I’d fight.”

The throat-clearer paused, considering this. “And tell me, in such a situation, do you think it would be possible for an Afghan journalist to come as you have come to us now, to meet and talk and eat with fighters from the British resistance?”

His question had an edge to it. It was, of course, inconceivable that this surreal meeting could have ever happened the other way around.
“Probably not,” I said.

“So why aren’t you scared now?”

“Because I understand that you are good Pashtuns. I have faith in your respect for Pashtun Wali, for malmastia.”
“Yes,” he nodded equitably.”Without malmastia;, we would certainly kill you.”

It was hard to imagine these people ever being defeated. I recall reading an interview with a Para whose patrol had been ambushed by a single gunman, who popped up with an AK at close quarters with no earthly possibility of survival. “You do wonder what goes through their little minds sometimes, don’t you?” the Para told the reporter.

The only absence was that of more detailed data on troop deployments and dates of the operations concerned; providing maps, especially of the towns where the bulk of the fighting occurred would also have been useful. These minor quibbles I think this is an extremely important book for anybody who wants to understand the nature and problems of the initial British deployment in southern Afghanistan and the kind of challenges that face current British strategy in the region. Needless to say Fergusson is quite pessimistic of both British intentions and the appropriateness of the strategy and the chances of success that

The Siege of Mecca – Yaroslav Trofimov

Published on July 16, 2009 in Reviews. 4 Comments Tags: , , .

siege-meccaI looked forward to reading this book, since I had heard and read much in the general histories of the region about the 1979 siege but did not know many details. Indeed, given the sensitive nature of the uprising few of the details and actual occurrences were known or released into the public sphere by the ever secretive and oppressive Saudi regime. I have to say though that this book, while delivering a decent narrative outline of the whole episode and some genuinely valuable eyewitness accounts, did irritate me greatly with its tone and some of its misrepresentations. Firstly, the author is clearly an anti-Islamist and tends to stereotype all religious fundamentalists despite their differences; it is hard not to come away with the impression that there is also a hidden vein of dislike for religious Islam in general here; which is fine in itself but not when it seeps into the portrayal of subjects and evens one is trying to reconstruct as an objective or independent writer. Endless repetitions about what Islamists fantasised about American and Zionist involvement in the siege seem a little pointless after a while; and the repeated discussion of the hadiths which foretell the appearance of the Mahdi and his meeting with Jesus in Damascus, with the consequent massacring of Christian crusader armies and then of ‘the Jews’ seem gratuitous; especially as they are not really contextualised with a proper discussion of the reliability and the variability of such Hadiths. Consequently some readers might come away with the impression that this is a widely prevalent belief or view in Islam (which it isn’t). Thirdly, the author right criticises Western intelligence agencies for misunderstanding the basic nature of Juhannamiyah’s uprising and the its roots in the Wahabi Sunni community of Nejd and the appeal it had amongst the more conservatively inclined youth confused by the contradiction between the extremist utterances of the Saudi Ulema and the reality of the slowly liberalising Saudi state in social norms; and for mistaking the uprising as an Iranian inspired Shi’ite rebellion. This tendency to see the hand of Iran everywhere in the wake of the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis was damaging to the US’s ability to respond and understand the events occurring within the Saudi kingdom and the region. Yet, Trofimov falls prey to the same error himself and attributes the regional rioting and assaults on US embassies that took place in cities as far flung as Islamabad, Dhaka, Calcutta and Tripoli to Iran radio’s broadcasts of an American and Zionist plot in the attack on the holy city and its shrine. However, as Trofimov himself notes, in several instances these attacks were fomented largely by distinct political entrepreneurs such as the Congress party in Calcutta which wanted to mobilise Muslim opinion behind it and cause an embarrassing disturbance for the Janata govt of the time. Even in the cases within the region, genuine causes that motivated anger towards the US such as open American support for repressive and feudal regimes, partisan attitudes towards Israel in the Palestinian conflict are overlooked.

Some of the more serious errors come in Trofimov’s analysis of the Iranian Revolution and its causes. The impression is conveyed that is was Carter’s weakness and his distancing of the US from the Shah’s regime, due to a concern over human rights that paved the way for the Revolution. He also cites as an example, a refusal to supply tear gas to the Iranian security forces when requested, as an example of this policy of dovishness, apparently personified by Cyrus Vance, the then Secretary of State. These claims ring a little hollow; it was Carter after all in a broadcast interview on Iranian TV who described the Shah as a “Man of Peace” decades before another American President would later use the same term to describe Ariel Sharon. It was no more suitable then than it was years later. Already by the end of the Nixon Presidency Iran along with Israel were the two non-NATO allies that had virtually total access to any American technology and military supplies with the exception of nuclear weaponry. It was not lack of weaponry, tear gas or American support that toppled the Shah but the collapse of domestic support for the regime, exacerbated the strong arm policies of repression which managed to alienate all key segments of society. It seems unlikely that any stronger American action could have saved this regime and would in all likelihood have aggravated matters. Of the support the US gave to Shah in his authoritarian and increasingly unpopular rule and the shameful subversion of the democratic Iranian government in 1953, Trofimov keeps silent. Indeed, whenever the US or an American institution does make an appearance in this narrative; it is as plucky Foreign Service officials, capable CIA officers or worried politicians and bureaucrats. The wider policies and problems the actions of this network of state institutions were creating in the region and their less pleasant aspects are also ignored. Trofimov is similarly ignorant of the realities of the Afghan situation in the 1970s and the reluctance of the Russians to actually support the Saur revolution or the degree to which the 1979 intervention was the outcome of internal disputes within the PDSPA and the Parcham-Khalq rivalry between Amin and Kamal.

Lastly, the somewhat sensationalist tone of the account does beggar belief sometimes. Excessive reliance on the testimony of participants whose accounts may not always have been 100% reliable is an inevitable problem but Trofimov should have exerted better care in sifting trhough some of the more fantastic claims. The one, for example, that Juhanniyma and Abdullah, the principal leaders of the uprising were homosexual lovers though, should be treated with extreme scepticism rather than just commented on as an aside by Trofimov. Absurdist episodes, such as the incident where one rioter presents himself at the American embassy in Tripoli; after having trashed the place the day before and participated in terrorising the diplomats there and then expresses outrage when the door is shut in his face as he is demanding a visa to complete his degree in the US -seem to beggar belief, especially as the sole source is the eponymous US official who was involved. Indeed while carefully sourced, the complete lack of footnotes makes it very difficult to trace exactly what source is supporting which claim and this lack of clarity obscures any attempt to judge just how strong some of the wilder claims in the book are.

So much for the bad, now for the good. Trofimov does provide a very effective account of all the military operations and the internal debates that took place in the storming of the mosque. He also has the chance to interview several survivors amongst the militants who took over the mosque and so for the first time we hear their story and background as well. The sheer lack of organisation and the ability of the Saudi regime to respond effectively is clearly outlined; the sole piece of luck was the ability to impose a news blackout in a pre-internet and pre-mobile phone age; which gave a crucial advantage to the authorities. The near-suicidal frontal assaults by Saudi security forces, are painfully reminiscent to my mind of the similar attacks undertaken by the Indian army in the assault on the Golden Temple in 1984 with the same bloody results. In the end only the recourse to armoured APCs and heavy artillery were able to dislodge the militants from their well fortified positions. Luckily for the Saudis, unlike for the Indian army, the militants respected the sanctity of the Kaaba and did not use it as a base of operations. However, they were able to retreat to the byzantine maze of underground chambers the Qaboo, where they proved almost impossible to dislodge. The Saudis were pre-empted by the Americans, who first revealed the occurrence of an incident at the holy shrine and despite repeated assurances that the mosque was recaptured, the inability to broadcast any prayer services from the mosque as had been the practise belied such claims and undermined Saudi credibility. It was in this case and faced with a long drawn out battle with the militants in the Qaboo that the Saudis finally sought outside help. After turning down offers of help from the Jordanians with their highly trained special units; due to fears that Hashemite involvement in regaining control of the site would reignite a demand that they be returned to Hashemite custody – a fear which prevented seeking aid from any fellow Arab state; and also turning down American assistance after an initial attempt by the CIA to use tear gas to evict the militants from the Qaboo ended in ignomious failure, the Saudis finally turned to the French with whom several members of the Royal Family such as Prince Turki had links. Especially to elite GIGN counter-terrorist unit. It is here, that Trofimov’s account is really valuable as by interviewing both several of the participants and having obtained declassified documents he is able to show that while French troops never participated in any of the fighting in the holy shrine; a GIGN team was flown to Saudi Arabia where with special equipment; including CB gas (later used by Russian special forces in the Moscow theatre siege) body armour and chemical proof suits; they were able to train several companies of Saudi soldiers and National guard to gas the Qaboo and then enter it in sweeping operation. This final operation was undertaken successfully; though civilian casualties were heavy; primarily as a result of the Saudi forces firing indiscriminately and refusing to take prisoners. This episode is carefully and well sourced in its description debunking several myths of what actually went on in the final stages of the siege.

Finally, what is most interesting but which Trofimov only briefly touches on; are the long term consequences of the siege. Firstly, this indicated the level of unrest amongst the Sunni population in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries and the dissatisfaction that many had with the nature of the their regimes and their desire for a more Islamic government. The mistake that the Saudi regime made was to think that this could be unproblematically harnessed and sent abroad – in this sense the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a godsend for regimes looking to ship off such troublemakers to conflicts far away. Yet the basic contradiction between a regime that rested on a deeply fundamentalist ideology, that its rulers did not follow in practise and subverted through their foreign policy alliance with the US was to return home after the end of the Afghan war and manifest itself in the fallout of the 1991 Gulf war when outrage over American presence in the kingdom laid the basis for future extremism. More discerningly, in the wake of the siege, American stock was at an all time low in the region with the deep unpopularity it had and the seeming powerlessness in the face of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis; many states were wary of appearing to be too close to the US and traditional allies like the Saudis watched with nervousness how the erstwhile US ally, the Pahlavi regime in Iran had crumbled despite generous US backing. What changed was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which brought the Communist threat very close to the Gulf region for the first time and turned countries like Pakistan into frontline states and US allies. Motivated really by a fear that any ideology which offered a more egalitarian and less oppressive rule than the Wahabi brand of Islam to the populace at large; meant that Communism, just like radical non-state sanctioned Islam and Arab socialism, Nasserism and Pan-Arabism all needed to be combated. The results were the hardening of US attitudes to protect existing regimes in the region as expressed in the Carter doctrine and the burgeoning US-Saudi co-operation in defence matters.

I found this book largely disappointing but a valuable read nonetheless to the hitherto uncovered detail that it provided. Had the writer kept his own WSJ ideology and personal prejudices in check and been a bit more critical of the wider US role in the region; it could have been a much better book.

“Read!” he was commanded

Published on July 16, 2009 in Misc. Closed Tags: .

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